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Abstract: An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports 
leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and 
across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and 
advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate 
with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a 
joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a 
regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of 
cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have 
common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation 
among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National 
Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major 
League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that 
the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does 
not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at 
best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. 
These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses.
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Competition and Cooperation Between Professional Sports Franchises: 
The Impact on Ticket Prices 
 
 
Most metropolitan areas that have a major North American professional sports 
franchise (i.e., the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the 
National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) also have a franchise from at least 
one of the other leagues. The extent to which franchises from different leagues compete 
for fans and advertisers is a matter of much dispute, as evidenced by the controversy over 
the delineation of the relevant product market in antitrust lawsuits involving sports 
leagues.1 The defendant league typically argues that it (and its member franchises) 
operates in a broad “entertainment market” in which it competes against other 
professional sports leagues, as well as other forms of entertainment such as movies. The 
plaintiff typically contends that there are no good substitutes for the product produced by 
the defendant league and thus the relevant market is limited to the league’s product (i.e., 
the defendant league is a monopoly). 
The extent to which major professional sports franchises in the same metropolitan 
area compete is ultimately an empirical question which has received little attention.2 I 
conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of average ticket prices in the NBA, NFL, 
NHL, and MLB and test whether the presence of other franchises in the same 
metropolitan area is associated with lower ticket prices, as one may expect if franchises 
compete with one another for fan attendance at home games. 
On the other hand, some franchises cooperate with one another. The most extreme 
form of cooperation is common ownership. Numerous franchises share a common 
ownership with another franchise in a different league. I test whether franchises with 
common ownership charge higher ticket prices. If franchises in the same metropolitan 
area compete for attendance at home games, then placing some of those franchises under 
common ownership may reduce competition, thereby possibly leading to higher ticket 
prices. On the other hand, placing some of the franchises under common ownership may 
produce cost savings and thereby possibly lead to lower ticket prices if a portion of the 
cost savings is passed on to fans. 
Another form of cooperation is the joint venture. Some franchises participate in 
joint ventures with franchises in different leagues to own the stadiums where they play 
their home games. Such a joint venture could produce cost savings that may be passed on 
to fans, but also could reduce competition between the joint venture participants for 
attendance at home games.  
                                                
1 See Pelnar (2007) for a summary of market definition arguments presented in a wide 
variety of antitrust lawsuits involving sports leagues. 
2 A notable exception is Winfree et al. (2004) which examines competition between 
nearby MLB teams and finds that (1) “the closer two teams are, the lower the attendance 
is at each team relative to two teams that are further apart” and (2) “when a new team 
moves into the area for an existing team, there is an additional initial reduction in 
attendance for the incumbent team.” (p. 2117) 
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Other franchises participate in regional sports network (RSN) joint ventures with 
franchises from the same or different leagues to broadcast their games. Once again, these 
joint ventures could produce cost savings that are passed on to fans who attend home 
games in the form of lower ticket prices, but also could reduce competition between the 
joint venture participants, thereby resulting in higher advertising rates and ticket prices.  
The econometric analysis of ticket prices for the 2008 MLB, NFL, NHL, and 
NBA seasons suggests that ticket prices of a major professional sports franchise are not 
impacted by the presence of other major professional sports franchises in the same 
metropolitan area. This finding is consistent with a lack of competition between 
franchises in different leagues. It is also consistent, however, with the hypothesis that 
competition from other sources of entertainment, such as movie theaters, is sufficiently 
intense as to constrain the pricing of tickets to sporting events, making the incremental 
competitive effect of a rival franchise statistically insignificant. Another possibility is that 
the sample size is too small to detect the competitive effect. 
Likewise, the econometric results suggest that ticket prices to major professional 
sporting events do not depend on whether several franchises in a metropolitan area have 
common ownership, whether franchises jointly own the stadium, or whether franchises 
participate in an RSN joint venture. Once again, these results could reflect the intensity of 
competition from other sources of entertainment or a failure to detect the competitive 
effect due to small sample size. A third possibility is that the effect of any reduction in 
competition is offset by cost savings passed on to fans, so that the net effect on ticket 
prices is roughly zero. 
 
I.   Background and Hypotheses   
Assuming that other forms of entertainment do not completely constrain the 
pricing for professional sporting events, ticket prices for such events should be lower if 
the franchise faces competition from at least one other professional sports franchise in the 
same metropolitan area. In fact, the ticket price to a professional sports event may be a 
decreasing function of the number of professional sports franchises which play their 
games in the area. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ticket prices for a franchise’s games will be lower if another franchise 
plays its games in the same metropolitan area. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ticket prices for a franchise’s games will be a decreasing function of the 
number of other professional sports franchises also playing their games in the same 
metropolitan area.  
 
Table I.1 shows groupings of major professional sports franchises by metropolitan 
area, as of the 2008 MLB season and the 2008-09 NFL, NBA, and NHL seasons. In the 
absence of data on where each franchise draws its fans, there is a certain amount of 
subjectivity in assigning franchises to a particular metropolitan area. For example, the 
NFL’s Green Bay Packers formerly played half its home games in Milwaukee, home of 
the NBA’s Bucks and MLB’s Brewers. One could argue that the Bucks and Brewers not 
only compete with each other, but with the Packers as well. I assume, however, that this 
is not the case. I code Green Bay as a one team market – the Packers – and Milwaukee as 
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a two-team market – the Brewers and the Bucks. Assumptions also had to be made about 
the San Francisco/Oakland3, New York/northern New Jersey4, and Los Angeles/Anaheim 
regions5. One could reasonably argue that a particular franchise should have been 
included in a metro area but was not, or should not have been included but was. For the 
reader who wishes to investigate the impact of alternative assumptions, the appendix 
contains the data used in the analysis. 
                                                
3 The NBA’s Golden State Warriors currently play in Oakland, but formerly played in 
San Francisco. I assume that the Warriors draw basketball fans from both San Francisco 
and Oakland and thus compete in the same market as the NFL’s Oakland Raiders and San 
Francisco 49ers and MLB’s Oakland Athletics and San Francisco Giants. However, I 
assume that football and baseball fans in San Francisco (Oakland) attend 49ers (Raiders) 
and Giants (Athletics) games. In other words, the 49ers compete for fan attendance with 
the Giants and Warriors, while the Raiders compete for fan attendance with the Athletics 
and the Warriors. 
 
4 I assume that New York residents attend Knicks, Rangers, and Islanders games, while 
northern New Jersey residents attend Nets and Devils games, and that both New York 
and northern New Jersey residents attend the NFL’s Giants and Jets games and MLB’s 
Yankees and Mets games. In other words, the NFL’s Giants and Jets compete for fans 
with the NBA’s Knicks and Nets, MLB’s Yankees and Mets, and the NHL’s Rangers, 
Islanders, and Devils, whereas the NHL’s Devils compete for fans with the NBA’s Nets 
(but not the Knicks), the NFL’s Giants and Jets, and MLB’s Yankees and Mets, but not 
with either of the “New York” NHL franchises (i.e., the Rangers and Islanders). 
 
5 I assume that if a league has both a “Los Angeles” franchise and an “Anaheim” 
franchise then these franchises do not compete. For example, the NHL’s Los Angeles 
Kings and Anaheim Ducks are assumed to draw fans from Los Angeles and Anaheim, 
respectively, whereas the NBA’s Los Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers are 
assumed to draw fans from the entire Los Angeles-Anaheim metro area since there is no 
specifically “Anaheim” NBA franchise. A problem arises in the case of MLB’s Angels, 
who have at times been named the “California Angels”, the “Anaheim Angels”, and the 
“Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim.” Given the existence of MLB’s Los Angeles Dodgers, 
I assume that the Angels and Dodgers draw their fans from Anaheim and Los Angeles, 
respectively, and thus do not compete.  
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Table I.1: Major Professional Sports Franchises, by Metropolitan Area  
 
Metropolitan Area NBA NHL NFL MLB 
Anaheim (NHL & MLB) Clippers, Lakers Ducks  Angels 
Atlanta Hawks Thrashers Falcons Braves 
Baltimore   Ravens Orioles 
Boston Celtics Bruins Patriots Red Sox 
Buffalo  Sabres Bills  
Calgary  Flames   
Charlotte Bobcats  Panthers  
Chicago Bulls Blackhawks Bears Cubs, White Sox 
Cincinnati   Bengals Reds 
Cleveland Cavaliers  Browns Indians 
Columbus  Blue Jackets   
Dallas Mavericks Stars Cowboys Rangers 
Denver Nuggets Avalanche Broncos Rockies 
Detroit Pistons Red Wings Lions Tigers 
Edmonton  Oilers   
Green Bay   Packers  
Houston Rockets  Texans Astros 
Indianapolis Pacers  Colts  
Jacksonville   Jaguars  
Kansas City   Chiefs Royals 
Los Angeles Clippers, Lakers Kings  Dodgers 
Memphis Grizzlies    
Miami Heat Panthers Dolphins Marlins 
Milwaukee Bucks   Brewers 
Minneapolis Timberwolves Wild Vikings Twins 
Montreal  Canadians   
Nashville  Predators Titans  
New Orleans Hornets  Saints  
New York & Northern New Jersey 
(NFL & MLB) 
Knicks, Nets Devils, 
Islanders, 
Rangers 
Giants, Jets Mets, Yankees 
New York (NBA & NHL) Knicks Islanders, 
Rangers 
Giants, Jets Mets, Yankees 
Northern New Jersey (NBA & NHL) Nets Devils Giants, Jets Mets, Yankees 
Oakland (NFL & MLB) Warriors  Raiders Athletics 
Oklahoma City Thunder    
Orlando Magic    
Ottawa  Senators   
Philadelphia 76ers Flyers Eagles Phillies 
Phoenix Suns Coyotes Cardinals Diamondbacks 
Pittsburgh  Penguins Steelers Pirates 
Portland Trailblazers    
Raleigh  Hurricanes   
San Diego   Chargers Padres 
Sacramento Kings    
Salt Lake City Jazz    
San Antonio Spurs    
San Francisco (NFL & MLB) Warriors  49ers Giants 
San Francisco Bay area (NBA) Warriors  49ers, 
Raiders 
Athletics, Giants 
San Jose  Sharks   
Seattle   Seahawks Mariners 
St. Louis  Blues Rams Cardinals 
Tampa  Lightning Buccaneers Rays 
Toronto Raptors Maple Leafs  Blue Jays 
Vancouver  Canucks   
Washington, D.C. Wizards Capitals Redskins Nationals 
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In some cases, the NHL and NBA franchises not only play in the same 
metropolitan area, they play in the same stadium during seasons that largely coincide.6 
Thus, the cost of getting to the stadium is the same whether a fan attends the NBA or 
NHL game and will not be a determining factor in which game is attended (although it 
may be a factor in whether any game at all is attended). The NHL and NBA franchises 
can compete for fan attendance along a number of dimensions, including ticket prices and 
team quality. Table I.2 lists franchises that played their games at the same stadium during 
the 2008 season. All else equal, ticket prices may be expected to be lower if another 
professional sports franchise plays its games at the same stadium. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ticket prices will be lower, all else equal, if a franchise plays its games at 
the same stadium as another franchise, either from the same or a different league. 
 
 
Table I.2: Franchises Playing at the Same Stadium 
 
Metro Area Stadium NBA NHL NFL MLB 
Atlanta Philips Arena Hawks Thrashers   
Boston TD Garden Celtics Bruins   
Chicago United Center Bulls Blackhawks   
Dallas American Airlines Center Mavericks Stars   
Denver Pepsi Center Nuggets Avalanche   
Los Angeles Staples Center Clippers, Lakers Kings   
Miami Land Shark Stadium   Dolphins Marlins 
Minneapolis Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome   Vikings Twins 
New York City Madison Square Garden Knicks Rangers   
Oakland Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum   Raiders Athletics 
Philadelphia Wachovia Center 76ers Flyers   
Toronto Air Canada Centre Raptors Maple Leafs   
Washington, D.C. Verizon Center Wizards Capitals   
 
 
There are several areas where some franchises cooperate. Some franchises in 
different leagues share a common owner.  Table I.3 provides a list, as of the 2008 
season.7 For example, the NBA’s Atlanta Hawks and the NHL’s Atlanta Thrashers are 
both owned by Atlanta Spirit LLC and play their games at the same stadium and, 
therefore, ticket prices for the two teams will be set so as to maximize their joint profits, 
whereas, for example, the NBA’s Boston Celtics and NHL’s Boston Bruins, which also 
play at the same stadium but have different owners, will each set ticket prices to 
maximize their individual, not joint, profits. To the extent that NBA and NHL games are 
                                                
6 Less commonly, MLB and NFL teams play at the same stadium, although the MLB and 
NFL regular- and post-seasons overlap for less than two months. 
 
7 Note that the owner of the Denver Nuggets and Colorado Avalanche also owns a stake 
in the St. Louis Rams, but the Rams are not located in the same metro area as the Nuggets 
and Avalanche. Thus, the Nuggets and Avalanche are coded as having common 
ownership, but not the Rams. Similarly, Paul Allen owns both the Portland Trailblazers 
and the Seattle Seahawks, but since the franchises are located in different metro areas, 
they are not coded as having common ownership. 
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substitutes, the Atlanta Spirit may be expected to price tickets for Hawks and Thrashers 
games higher than the Celtics and Bruins, all else equal. On the other hand, if joint 
ownership results in cost savings, ticket prices for the home games of jointly-owned 
franchises may be lower than those of other franchises. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Ticket prices of franchises sharing a common ownership will be higher 
(lower) than those of other franchises, all else equal, if the effect of the reduction in 
competition between the franchises is greater (less) than the cost savings produced by 
common ownership that are passed on to fans. 
 
 
Table I.3: Franchises with Common Ownership 
 
Owner NBA NHL NFL MLB 
Atlanta Spirit Hawks Thrashers   
Comcast Spectacor 76ers Flyers   
E. Stanley Kroenke Nuggets Avalanche Rams  
Jerry Reinsdorf Bulls   White Sox 
Madison Square Garden (Cablevision) Knicks Rangers   
Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Raptors Maple Leafs   
Michael Ilitch  Red Wings  Tigers 
Paul Allen Trailblazers  Seahawks  
Tom Hicks  Stars  Rangers 
 
 
A second area of cooperation between franchises is sometimes joint ownership of 
the stadium at which the teams play. Table I.4 provides a list. For example, the NBA’s 
Chicago Bulls and the NHL’s Chicago Blackhawks are joint owners of the United Center, 
where both franchises play their home games. It may be the case that cooperation 
between franchises in running the stadiums that they jointly own leads to a reduction in 
competition for fans. Alternatively, the cost savings from joint ownership of the stadium 
may be passed on to sports fans in the form of lower ticket prices. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ticket prices of franchises which jointly own the stadium at which they 
play will be higher (lower) than those of other franchises, all else equal, if the effect of 
the reduction in competition between the franchises is greater (less) than the cost savings 
produced by joint ownership of the stadium that are passed on to fans. 
 
 
Table I.4: Jointly-Owned Stadiums 
 
Metro Area Stadium NBA NHL NFL MLB 
Chicago United Center Bulls Blackhawks   
Dallas American Airlines Center Mavericks Stars   
 
 
Another area of cooperation between franchises is sometimes joint ownership of a 
regional sports network. Table I.5 provides a list. For example, in Chicago, four of the 
five major professional sports franchises – MLB’s Cubs and White Sox, as well as the 
NBA’s Bulls and the NHL’s Blackhawks – participate in an RSN joint venture with 
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Comcast. The exception is the NFL’s Chicago Bears. The NFL has a rule against 
franchise-owned RSNs. The impact of joint ownership of an RSN on ticket prices 
depends on the effect on competition and the magnitude of the cost savings passed on to 
sports fans in the form of lower ticket prices. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Ticket prices of franchises which jointly own an RSN will be higher 
(lower) than those of other franchises, all else equal, if the effect of the reduction in 
competition between the franchises is greater (less) than the cost savings produced by 
joint ownership of the RSN that are passed on to fans. 
 
 
Table I.5: Jointly-Owned Regional Sports Networks 
 
Metro Area MLB NBA NHL NFL 
Baltimore & Washington, D.C. Orioles, Nationals    
Boston Red Sox  Bruins  
Chicago Cubs, White Sox Bulls Blackhawks  
 
 
Hypotheses 1-6 are investigated by conducting a cross-sectional regression 
analysis of average ticket prices across teams in the same league over a single season. 
Hypotheses 1-3 make definite predictions about the signs of certain regression 
coefficients, whereas Hypotheses 4-6 do not, although the latter offer guidance on the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients. One limitation of the analysis is that, since 
there are only 32 NFL teams and 30 NBA, NHL, and MLB teams each, the sample size 
for each cross-sectional regression is quite small.8 Therefore, a 10% significance level 
may be more appropriate for testing the hypotheses than the more commonly used 5% 
and 1% levels.9 
The econometric model estimated is: 
 
Price = f(competition, cooperation, product quality, metro characteristics) + error term. 
 
The linear version of this model is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
using the R statistical package. 
                                                
8 Other studies which examine team data for a single season include Fort (2004) and 
Boyd & Boyd (1998). Some studies examine panel data for teams over a number of 
seasons, including Brown et al. (2006), Winfree et al. (2004), and Rishe & Mondello 
(2003). 
 
9 For a discussion of sample size and the choice of significance level for hypothesis 
testing, see Hendry (1995, p. 490). 
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II.   Data and Sources 
The dependent variable in the estimated regression model is average ticket price 
as reported by Team Marketing Report (TMR) for the 2008-09 NFL, NBA, and NHL 
seasons and the 2008 MLB season.10 The average price is a weighted average of season 
ticket prices for general seating categories, excluding premium seating (i.e., tickets that 
come with at least one added amenity) and luxury suites. TMR converts the ticket prices 
for franchises located in Canada to U.S. dollars. 
The explanatory variables in the regression model fall into three groups: 
competition/cooperation variables, control variables for the quality of a franchise’s 
product, and control variables for differences among metropolitan areas. Table II.1 
provides more details on each of the variables considered (not all of which are included 
in the final specifications).11  
The ‘cooperation’ variables indicate whether the franchise in question shares a 
common owner with another franchise located in the same metropolitan area, whether the 
franchise participated in a stadium ownership joint venture with another franchise, and 
whether the franchise participated in a regional sports network joint venture with another 
franchise, while the ‘competition’ variables indicate the number or existence of other 
major professional sports franchises in the same metro area. Data on the ownership 
structures of sports franchises and their participation in joint ventures with other 
franchises is hand-collected from Wikipedia entries for each major professional sports 
franchise, each stadium where a franchise plays its games, and regional sports networks 
(as well as miscellaneous other websites). 
Since franchises with a higher quality product may be expected to charge higher 
ticket prices, all else equal, a number of quality variables are examined including winning 
percentage (or, in the case of the NHL, points) in the prior season, player payroll for the 
prior season, and number of league championships won while the franchise was in its 
current location.12 To avoid simultaneity issues, I include quality measures for the 2007 
season rather than the 2008 season.13 
                                                
10 Other studies analyzing TMR average ticket prices include Brown et al. (2006) and 
Rishe & Mondello (2003). 
 
11 The Appendix contains both the data for the variables used in the final specifications, 
as well as other variables which were considered. 
 
12 The calculation of championships involves a number of subjective judgments. For 
teams such as the NFL’s Oakland Raiders that have moved around, it is assumed that fans 
care only about the championships won while the franchise was in their current metro 
area. Thus, although the Raiders have won three Super Bowls in their entire team history, 
the Raiders have zero championships at their current location because they moved to Los 
Angeles in 1982, where they won their third Super Bowl, and moved back to Oakland in 
1995, and have yet to win a Super Bowl since returning to Oakland. One could argue that 
the two Super Bowls won while the Raiders were in Oakland (prior to their move to Los 
Angeles) should be included in the tally, or that all three Super Bowl wins should be 
included. Also, prior to the first Super Bowl, both the National Football League and the 
American Football League had respective champions, but I tally only the championships 
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Control variables for differences across metropolitan areas include population, 
population per major professional sports franchise in the area, and regional dummy 
variables (i.e., Northeast U.S., Southeast U.S., Northcentral U.S., Southcentral U.S., West 
Coast U.S., and Canada). Per capita income data are available for U.S. franchises, but not 
Canadian franchises.14   
 
Table II.1: Variable List 
 
Variable Definition and Source 
Dependent variable:  
AveTick2008 Weighted average ticket price for the 2008 MLB season and 2008-09 NFL, NBA, and 
NHL seasons. Excludes premium seating (i.e., tickets that come with at least one added 
amenity) and luxury suites. Source: Team Marketing Report.  
 
  
Explanatory variables:  
Attend2007 Attendance for the 2007 season. Source: ESPN website. 
 
Attend_to_capacity2007 Attendance for the 2007 season as a percentage of stadium capacity. Source: ESPN 
website. 
 
Canada, NE, SE,NC,SC, 
West 
Dummy variable = 1 if franchise is based in Canada, northeast U.S, southeast U.S., north 
central U.S., south central U.S., or western U.S., respectively. 
 
Championships Number of league championships won since the franchise has been in its current 
metropolitan area. Source: Wikipedia. 
 
Franchise_current_city The year the franchise began playing its home games in its current metropolitan area.15 
Source: Wikipedia. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of the National Football League franchises due to that league’s long history. One also 
could reasonably argue that championships won by American Football League franchises 
prior to the first Super Bowl should be included in the tally. 
 
13 For example, player payroll for the 2008 season may be a function of the average ticket 
price for that season. Thus, I consider player payroll data for the prior (2007) season. 
 
14 Since the NFL does not have any Canadian franchises, per capita income can be 
included as an explanatory variable without dropping any observations. Since there is 
only one MLB and one NBA franchise located in Canada, per capita income can be 
included as an explanatory variable by reducing the sample size from 30 to 29. However, 
there are six Canadian NHL franchises so including per capita income as an explanatory 
variable would reduce the sample size from 30 to 24. 
 
15 The NFL’s Oakland Raiders moved to Los Angeles in 1982 and back to Oakland in 
1995 so the franchise’s current tenure in Oakland is measured from 1995. Also, 
Hurricane Katrina forced the NFL’s Saints and NBA’s Hornets to move their home 
games and thus their current tenure in New Orleans is measured relative to the date they 
resumed playing their home games in New Orleans. One could argue that this measure 
understates the franchises’ “roots” in these cities.  
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Table II.1: Variable List 
 
Franchise_current_stadium The year the franchise began playing its home games in its current stadium. Source: 
Wikipedia. 
 
Income Per capita income of the metropolitan area where the franchise operates. (U.S. franchises 
only) Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book. 
 
JVstadium Dummy variable = 1 if franchise plays its home games in a stadium which is the product 
of a joint venture with another major professional sports franchise. Source: Wikipedia.  
 
MLBexist, NBAexist, 
NFLexist, NHLexist 
Dummy variable = 1 if there exists another MLB, NBA, NFL, or NHL franchise, 
respectively, in the same metropolitan area.  
 
MLBteams, NBAteams, 
NFLteams, NHLteams 
Number of other MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL franchises located in the same 
metropolitan area. 
 
Own_another_franchise Dummy variable = 1 if Own_NBA = 1, Own_NHL = 1, Own_MLB = 1, or Own_NFL = 
1. 
 
Own_NBA, Own_NFL, 
Own_NHL, Own_MLB 
Dummy variable = 1 if franchise shares a common owner with an NBA, NFL, NHL or 
MLB franchise, respectively, located in the same metropolitan area. Source: Wikipedia. 
 
Payroll2007 Player payroll for the 2007 season. Source: ESPN website. 
 
Points2007 Points at the end of the 2007 NHL season. Source: ESPN website.  
 
Population Population of the metropolitan area where the franchise operates. Source: U.S. Census 
Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (U.S. franchises); Statistics Canada 
(Canadian franchises). 
 
Pop_per_team Population/Totalteams. 
 
RSNJV_NBA, 
RSNJV_NHL, 
RSNJV_MLB 
Dummy variable = 1 if franchise participated in a regional sports network joint venture 
with an NBA, NHL, or MLB franchise located in the same metro area, respectively. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
 
RSNJV Dummy variable = 1 if RSNJV_NBA = 1, RSNJV_NHL = 1, or RSNJV_MLB = 1. 
 
Share_NBA, Share_NFL, 
Share_NHL, Share_MLB 
Dummy variable = 1 if franchise shares a stadium with an NBA, NFL, NHL or MLB 
franchise, respectively, located in the same metropolitan area. Source: Wikipedia. 
 
Share_rivalNBA, 
Share_rivalNFL, 
Share_rivalNHL, 
Share_rivalMLB 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if franchise shares a stadium with an NBA, NFL, NHL or MLB 
franchise, respectively, located in the same metropolitan area with which it does not 
share common ownership. Source: Wikipedia. 
Tenure_in_stadium Number of consecutive years the franchise has played its home games in its current 
stadium. (=1+2008-Franchise_current_stadium) 
 
Totalteams Total number of major professional sports franchises in the metropolitan area. (= 1 + 
MLBteams + NBAteams + NFLteams + NHLteams) 
 
Winpct2007 Winning percentage at the end of the 2007 NFL, NBA, and MLB seasons. Source: ESPN 
website.  
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III.   NBA Ticket Prices: Econometric Results  
Model III.1 is a regression of average ticket price for each NBA team for the 
2008-09 season on population scaled by the total number of major professional sports 
franchises in the metropolitan area (a proxy for potential demand for attendance at an 
NBA franchise’s home games), player payroll for the 2007 season (a proxy for a 
franchise’s recent quality), and the number of championships the team has won during its 
current tenure in the metropolitan area (a proxy for a franchise’s historical quality). Each 
of the regression coefficients is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Model III.1 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q       Median       3Q      Max  
-17.6576  -5.9942  -0.3256   6.0763  18.0740  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -2.288e+00   1.171e+01   -0.195   0.84668    
Pop_per_team     9.740e-06   3.446e-06     2.826   0.00893 ** 
Payroll2007      5.363e-07   1.646e-07     3.258   0.00312 ** 
Championships    1.719e+00   4.877e-01     3.525   0.00159 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.657 on 26 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6329,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5906  
F-statistic: 14.94 on 3 and 26 DF,  p-value: 7.456e-06 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, various ‘competition’ variables are added as regressors to 
Model III.1. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the coefficients will be negative and statistically 
significant. Model III.2 adds a dummy variable indicating the existence of a rival NBA 
team in the same metropolitan area. The regression coefficient has the ‘wrong sign’ and 
is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model III.2 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NBAexist + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q         Median       3Q      Max  
-16.2622  -4.6458  -0.9675   6.2518  17.8471  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -1.214e+00   1.162e+01   -0.105   0.91757    
NBAexist         1.007e+01   8.002e+00    1.258   0.21987    
Pop_per_team     8.164e-06   3.631e-06    2.248   0.03362 *  
Payroll2007      5.475e-07   1.630e-07    3.358   0.00252 ** 
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Championships    1.527e+00   5.059e-01    3.018   0.00578 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.551 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6548,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5996  
F-statistic: 11.86 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 1.544e-05 
 
Model III.3 adds dummy variables indicating the existence of NHL, NFL, and 
MLB teams in the same metropolitan area. The coefficients of these dummy variables 
also are not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model III.3 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NBAexist + NHLexist + NFLexist + MLBexist +  
    Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-16.095  -5.158  -0.773   5.194  17.302  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -1.651e-01   1.227e+01   -0.013   0.98938    
NBAexist         5.502e+00   9.191e+00     0.599   0.55554    
NHLexist         5.886e+00   6.067e+00     0.970   0.34251    
NFLexist       -6.049e+00   5.932e+00   -1.020   0.31889    
MLBexist       -8.453e-01   6.849e+00   -0.123   0.90289    
Pop_per_team     5.773e-06   4.474e-06     1.290   0.21040    
Payroll2007      6.054e-07   2.079e-07     2.913   0.00807 ** 
Championships    1.487e+00   5.294e-01     2.808   0.01025 *  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.818 on 22 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.679,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.5768  
F-statistic: 6.648 on 7 and 22 DF,  p-value: 0.0002723 
 
 Alternatively, Model III.4 includes a dummy variable indicating NBA franchises 
with no other major professional sports team in the same metropolitan area. Hypothesis 1 
predicts the coefficient of the ‘single team market’ variable will be positive and 
statistically significant. However, the estimated coefficient is negative, but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Model III.4 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Oneteammarket + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q          Median       3Q      Max  
-17.8286  -5.8004  -0.4634   6.2689  18.0102  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -1.639e+00   1.276e+01   -0.128   0.89884    
Oneteammarket  -7.617e-01   5.283e+00   -0.144   0.88651    
Pop_per_team     1.000e-05   3.947e-06     2.534   0.01793 *  
Payroll2007      5.242e-07   1.874e-07     2.798   0.00976 ** 
Championships    1.703e+00   5.089e-01     3.347   0.00258 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.844 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6333,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5746  
F-statistic: 10.79 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 3.197e-05 
 
 Thus, the results of Models III.2-III.4 do not support Hypothesis 1 regarding the 
impact on ticket prices of competition from other sports franchises. 
To test Hypothesis 2, Model III.5 includes as an explanatory variable the total 
number of major professional sports teams in the metropolitan area. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that the coefficient of this regressor will be negative and statistically significant. 
However, the estimated coefficient is positive but is not statistically significant at the 
10% level. Therefore, the results of Model III.5 do not support Hypothesis 2. 
 
Model III.5 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Totalteams + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q         Median       3Q      Max  
-17.4702  -6.3038   0.1442   7.3249  17.4270  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -3.870e-01   1.180e+01   -0.033   0.97410    
Totalteams       1.306e+00   1.197e+00     1.091   0.28568    
Pop_per_team     9.833e-06   3.435e-06     2.863   0.00838 ** 
Payroll2007      4.440e-07   1.845e-07     2.406   0.02385 *  
Championships    1.588e+00   5.006e-01     3.172   0.00398 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.622 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6496,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5936  
F-statistic: 11.59 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 1.848e-05 
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 To test Hypothesis 3, Model III.6 adds as explanatory variables whether the NBA 
franchise plays its games in the same stadium as another NBA or NHL team. Hypothesis 
3 suggests that the coefficients of these ‘stadium sharing’ variables should be negative 
and statistically significant. However, the coefficient of neither ‘stadium sharing’ variable 
is statistically significant at the 10% level and one has the ‘wrong sign’.  
 
Model III.6 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_NBA + Share_NHL + Pop_per_team +  
    Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-18.6873  -4.8784  -0.0637   5.1427  16.5522  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)    -3.972e+00   1.191e+01   -0.333   0.74169    
Share_NBA        1.168e+01   8.148e+00     1.434   0.16445    
Share_NHL      -4.394e+00   4.287e+00   -1.025   0.31555    
Pop_per_team     8.845e-06   3.688e-06     2.398   0.02459 *  
Payroll2007      5.944e-07   1.692e-07     3.514    0.00178 ** 
Championships    1.659e+00   5.215e-01     3.181   0.00402 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.541 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6693,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.6004  
F-statistic: 9.714 on 5 and 24 DF,  p-value: 3.595e-05 
 
 
It may be argued that what matters is the sharing of a stadium with a team not 
owned by the NBA franchise. Model III.7 replaces the explanatory variable for sharing 
with any NHL team to one for sharing with a non-owned (‘rival’) NHL team. Once again, 
the regression coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% level and one has the 
‘wrong sign’. Consequently, the results of Models III.6-III.7 do not support Hypothesis 3. 
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Model III.7 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_NBA + Share_rivalNHL + Pop_per_team +  
    Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-17.273  -5.107  -1.226   5.825  17.493  
 
Coefficients: 
                  Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)     -2.112e+00   1.180e+01   -0.179   0.85945    
Share_NBA         1.249e+01   8.773e+00     1.423   0.16748    
Share_rivalNHL  -4.252e+00   5.998e+00   -0.709   0.48518    
Pop_per_team      8.412e-06   3.685e-06     2.283   0.03157 *  
Payroll2007       5.614e-07   1.659e-07     3.385   0.00245 ** 
Championships     1.708e+00   5.709e-01     2.991   0.00634 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.647 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6619,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5915  
F-statistic: 9.397 on 5 and 24 DF,  p-value: 4.62e-05 
 
 
To investigate Hypotheses 4-6, Model III.8 adds three ‘cooperation’ explanatory 
variables – ownership of another major professional sports franchise in the same 
metropolitan area, participation in a regional sports network joint venture with at least 
one other major professional sports franchise in the same metropolitan area, and 
participation in a stadium joint venture with at least one other major professional sports 
franchise. All three regression coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The interpretation of these results in the context of Hypotheses 4-6 is discussed 
below. 
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Model III.8 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Own_another_franchise + RSNJV + JVstadium +  
    Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-18.3191  -5.5252  -0.1802   5.2207  17.3985  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)             -3.423e+00   1.366e+01   -0.251   0.80433    
Own_another_franchise  -3.306e+00   5.270e+00   -0.627   0.53656    
RSNJV                    6.420e+00   1.728e+01     0.372   0.71365    
JVstadium                8.981e-01   1.166e+01     0.077   0.93928    
Pop_per_team             9.720e-06   3.702e-06     2.625   0.01512 *  
Payroll2007              5.620e-07   1.984e-07     2.833   0.00942 ** 
Championships            1.638e+00   5.411e-01     3.028   0.00598 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 10.13 on 23 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6425,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5492  
F-statistic: 6.888 on 6 and 23 DF,  p-value: 0.0002777 
 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the cooperation of an NBA team with other 
major professional sports teams in the same metropolitan area via either common 
ownership or stadium and/or regional sports network joint venture participation does not 
have a significant impact on ticket prices for the 2008 season. Nor does competition 
between an NBA team and other major professional sports teams in the same metro area 
have a significant impact on ticket prices. These results are consistent with any of three 
hypotheses: (1) NBA teams face sufficiently intense competition from other sources of 
entertainment so that the incremental effect of cooperation or competition with other 
teams is zero; (2) the home games of an NBA team lack good substitutes so that the 
incremental effect of cooperation or competition with other teams is zero; and (3) any 
positive impact of cooperation on ticket price is offset by the efficiencies produced by 
that cooperation and passed on to fans. 
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IV.   NHL Ticket Prices: Econometric Results  
The NHL is unique among the four major North American sports leagues because 
it has more than one franchise based in Canada. As detailed by Wong (2005), hockey was 
an enormously popular sport in Canada prior to the creation of the NHL, and its 
popularity spread to the northeastern U.S. Only much later did the NHL expand outside 
its core region, into the deep southern U.S. One may expect, therefore, that ticket prices 
to NHL games will be higher, all else equal, in Canada and the northeastern U.S. The 
results of Model IV.1 are consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable indicating franchises located in Canada or the northeastern U.S. is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and implies that ticket prices are $9.70 higher in this region 
relative to the rest of the U.S. where NHL franchises are located. The coefficient of 
championships is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.16 The coefficient 
of population scaled by the number of major professional sports franchises located in the 
same metro area as the NHL team is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model IV.1 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-13.765  -5.520  -1.040   4.661  17.696  
 
Coefficients: 
                Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)    4.285e+01   3.364e+00   12.738  1.10e-12 *** 
Pop_per_team   9.131e-07   2.569e-06      0.355   0.72516     
Championships  6.144e-01   3.529e-01      1.741   0.09348 .   
Canada_and_NE 9.723e+00   3.101e+00      3.135   0.00423 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.603 on 26 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4823, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4226  
F-statistic: 8.075 on 3 and 26 DF,  p-value: 0.0005777 
 
 
 Hypothesis 1 is tested by adding a dummy variable indicating the existence of a 
rival NHL team in the same metro area. In Model IV.2, the coefficient of this dummy 
variable is negative, as Hypothesis 1 predicts, but not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
 
                                                
16 Other proxies for team quality for the 2007 season were examined, such as player 
payroll and points in the league standings. The coefficients of these explanatory variables 
were not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Model IV.2 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NHLexist + Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-13.6706  -5.2816   0.1624   4.0015  17.8881  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)      4.207e+01   3.436e+00   12.243  4.67e-12 *** 
NHLexist       -6.474e+00   6.099e+00    -1.061   0.29864     
Pop_per_team     1.650e-06   2.655e-06      0.621   0.53997     
Championships    5.438e-01   3.582e-01      1.518   0.14157     
Canada_and_NE   1.074e+01   3.240e+00      3.316   0.00279 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.585 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5047,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.4254  
F-statistic: 6.368 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 0.001122 
 
 
 Model IV.3 adds dummy variables indicating the existence of NBA, NFL, and 
MLB franchises in the same metro area as the NHL franchise. None of the coefficients of 
these ‘competition’ dummy variables is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model IV.3 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NHLexist + NBAexist + NFLexist + MLBexist +  
    Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-14.338  -4.503  -1.335   3.827  16.610  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)      4.154e+01   5.414e+00     7.673  1.17e-07 *** 
NHLexist       -7.096e+00   6.872e+00   -1.033   0.31300     
NBAexist         4.570e+00   5.967e+00     0.766   0.45184     
NFLexist       -2.557e+00   4.328e+00   -0.591   0.56074     
MLBexist         1.160e-01   6.856e+00     0.017   0.98666     
Pop_per_team     1.243e-06   3.026e-06     0.411   0.68529     
Championships    5.240e-01   3.717e-01     1.410   0.17262     
Canada_and_NE   1.068e+01   3.475e+00     3.072   0.00558 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.769 on 22 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5427,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3972  
F-statistic:  3.73 on 7 and 22 DF,  p-value: 0.008236 
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 Model IV.4 tests whether NHL ticket prices are higher in ‘single team markets’ 
(i.e., metro areas with a single NHL team and no NBA, NFL, or MLB teams). Its 
coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model IV.4 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Oneteammarket + Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-13.970  -4.581  -0.557   4.368  17.536  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)      4.274e+01   3.425e+00   12.479  3.09e-12 *** 
Oneteammarket  -1.587e+00   3.448e+00    -0.460   0.64922     
Pop_per_team     1.252e-06   2.711e-06      0.462   0.64827     
Championships    5.952e-01   3.607e-01      1.650   0.11148     
Canada_and_NE   1.004e+01   3.225e+00      3.114   0.00458 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.721 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4867,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.4046  
F-statistic: 5.926 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 0.001698 
 
 
The results of Models IV.2-IV.4 therefore fail to support the prediction of 
Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by including the total number of major professional sports 
teams in the metro area as an explanatory variable. In Model IV.5, its coefficient has the 
‘wrong sign’ and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Consequently, the results 
of Model IV.5 do not support Hypothesis 2. 
 
Model IV.5 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Totalteams + Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-13.755  -5.446  -1.012   4.636  17.669  
 
Coefficients: 
                Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)    4.273e+01   4.390e+00    9.733  5.52e-10 *** 
Totalteams     3.748e-02   8.202e-01    0.046   0.96391     
Pop_per_team   9.161e-07   2.621e-06    0.350   0.72961     
Championships  6.151e-01   3.602e-01    1.708   0.10007     
Canada_and_NE  9.714e+00   3.167e+00    3.067   0.00514 **  
--- 
 22 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.754 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4824,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3996  
F-statistic: 5.825 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 0.001871  
 
 
 Some NHL franchises play their games in the same stadium as an NBA franchise. 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by adding a dummy variable indicating such NHL franchises. In 
Model IV.6, the coefficient of the ‘stadium sharing’ dummy variable has the ‘wrong sign’ 
and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model IV.6 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_NBA + Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-13.3220  -5.3320  -0.4998   4.0486  18.0968  
 
Coefficients: 
                Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)    4.271e+01   3.418e+00   12.495  3.01e-12 *** 
Share_NBA      1.769e+00   3.083e+00     0.574   0.57117     
Pop_per_team   5.947e-07   2.662e-06     0.223   0.82501     
Championships  6.389e-01   3.600e-01     1.775   0.08815 .   
Canada_and_NE  9.525e+00   3.161e+00     3.013   0.00585 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.703 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4891,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.4073  
F-statistic: 5.983 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 0.001609 
 
 
 Model IV.7 restricts the stadium sharing variable to only those where the NHL 
and NBA teams do not share common ownership. The coefficient is negative, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3, but is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Model IV.7 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_rivalNBA + Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-14.014  -5.577  -1.290   4.589  17.497  
 
Coefficients: 
                  Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)       4.274e+01   3.426e+00   12.476  3.11e-12 *** 
Share_rivalNBA  -1.769e+00   4.003e+00    -0.442   0.66237     
Pop_per_team      1.294e-06   2.749e-06      0.471   0.64182     
Championships      5.753e-01   3.692e-01    1.558   0.13174     
Canada_and_NE    9.702e+00   3.151e+00    3.079   0.00498 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.724 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4864,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.4042  
F-statistic: 5.918 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 0.001711 
 
 
 Hypotheses 4-6 are investigated by adding three ‘cooperation’ explanatory 
variables: a dummy variable indicating whether the NHL franchise shares common 
ownership with another major professional sports franchise in the same metro area, a 
dummy variable indicating whether the NHL franchise participates in a regional sports 
network joint venture with at least one other major professional sports franchise in the 
same metro area, and a dummy variable indicating whether the NHL franchise 
participates in a stadium joint venture with at least one other major professional sports 
franchise. In Model IV.8, the coefficients of all three cooperation variables are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model IV.8 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Own_another_franchise + RSNJV + JVstadium +  
    Pop_per_team + Championships + Canada_and_NE) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q         Median       3Q      Max  
-13.2649  -5.0811  -0.5646   3.3159  18.3145  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)              4.152e+01   3.620e+00   11.470  5.42e-11 *** 
Own_another_franchise    3.067e+00   3.706e+00      0.828   0.4165     
RSNJV                    9.795e+00   6.881e+00      1.423   0.1680     
JVstadium              -7.002e+00   7.321e+00    -0.956   0.3488     
Pop_per_team             1.807e-06   2.761e-06      0.654    0.5194     
Championships            4.778e-01   3.788e-01      1.261    0.2198     
Canada_and_NE            8.709e+00   3.321e+00      2.622    0.0152 *   
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--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 7.723 on 23 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5276,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.4044  
F-statistic: 4.281 on 6 and 23 DF,  p-value: 0.004866 
 
 
 In summary, neither cooperation nor competition between an NHL franchise and 
other professional sports franchises in the same metro area has a statistically significant 
impact on NHL ticket prices for the 2008 season. 
 
 
V.   MLB Ticket Prices: Econometric Results  
Model V.1 examines the impact on ticket prices of (1) population scaled by the 
number of major professional sports teams in the same metro area, (2) the number of 
championships won during a team’s current tenure in a metro area, (3) the number of 
years the team has played its home games at its current stadium, and (4) attendance 
during the 2007 season as a percent of stadium capacity. The coefficient of each of these 
explanatory variables is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in the case 
of the population variable and at 5% or better in the case of the other three variables. 
 
Model V.1 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Pop_per_team + Championships + Tenure_in_stadium +  
    Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q       Median      3Q     Max  
-6.5655 -2.6620  0.2093  2.2659  7.1200  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             5.055e+00   3.110e+00    1.625    0.11663     
Pop_per_team            2.953e-06   1.545e-06    1.912    0.06741 .   
Championships           3.793e-01   1.490e-01    2.545    0.01746 *   
Tenure_in_stadium       1.724e-01   3.196e-02    5.394  1.35e-05 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007  1.633e-01   4.236e-02    3.854    0.00072 *** 
---                            
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.722 on 25 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8147,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7851  
F-statistic: 27.48 on 4 and 25 DF,  p-value: 7.888e-09 
 
 
 Model V.2 tests Hypothesis 1 by adding a dummy variable indicating the 
existence of a rival MLB team in the same metro area. Its coefficient has the ‘wrong sign’ 
and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Model V.2 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ MLBexist + Pop_per_team + Championships +  
    Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q          Median       3Q      Max  
-6.06018 -2.71072 -0.09261  2.34922  7.11475  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             5.452e+00   3.443e+00    1.584   0.12637     
MLBexist                8.229e-01   2.790e+00    0.295   0.77058     
Pop_per_team            2.714e-06   1.771e-06    1.533   0.13847     
Championships           3.653e-01   1.589e-01    2.299   0.03055 *   
Tenure_in_stadium       1.697e-01   3.384e-02    5.014  4.01e-05 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007  1.619e-01   4.339e-02    3.731   0.00104 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.792 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8154,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7769  
F-statistic:  21.2 on 5 and 24 DF,  p-value: 4.299e-08 
 
 
 Model V.3 adds dummy variables for the existence of teams from the three other 
major professional sports leagues in the same metro area. None of the coefficients of 
these competition variables is statistically significant at the 10% level and only one has 
the ‘correct sign’. 
 
Model V.3 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ MLBexist + NFLexist + NBAexist + NHLexist +  
    Pop_per_team + Championships + Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q       Median      3Q     Max  
-5.6670 -1.9193 -0.4339  2.5898  6.8484  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)               2.663e+00   4.906e+00     0.543  0.592925     
MLBexist                  1.105e-01   3.018e+00     0.037  0.971129     
NFLexist                  2.446e+00   2.315e+00     1.057  0.302719     
NBAexist                  1.458e+00   1.899e+00     0.768  0.451255     
NHLexist                -1.543e+00   1.761e+00   -0.876  0.390947     
Pop_per_team              3.091e-06   1.856e-06     1.665  0.110731     
Championships             3.888e-01   1.663e-01     2.338  0.029358 *   
Tenure_in_stadium         1.665e-01   3.522e-02     4.726  0.000115 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007    1.658e-01   4.575e-02     3.625  0.001587 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
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Residual standard error: 3.881 on 21 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8308,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7664  
F-statistic: 12.89 on 8 and 21 DF,  p-value: 1.546e-06 
 
 
 No MLB franchise is located in a metro area which does not have at least one 
other major professional sports franchise located there. Therefore, it is not possible to 
estimate a model analogous to Models III.4, IV.4, and VI.4 which include a ‘one team 
market’ dummy variable as a regressor. 
 Overall, the results of Models V.2-V.3 do not support Hypothesis 1. 
 Model V.5 tests Hypothesis 2 by including the total number of teams in the metro 
area as a regressor. Its coefficient is negative, as Hypothesis 2 predicts, but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model V.5 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Totalteams + Pop_per_team + Championships +  
    Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q       Median      3Q     Max  
-6.7111 -2.6236  0.3552  2.1756  7.1974  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)               5.175e+00    3.268e+00     1.584  0.126385     
Totalteams              -8.535e-02    5.581e-01   -0.153  0.879729     
Pop_per_team              3.059e-06    1.720e-06     1.778  0.088030 .   
Championships             3.913e-01    1.712e-01     2.286  0.031367 *   
Tenure_in_stadium         1.733e-01    3.310e-02     5.235  2.29e-05 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007    1.633e-01    4.322e-02     3.779  0.000919 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.797 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8149,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7763  
F-statistic: 21.13 on 5 and 24 DF,  p-value: 4.434e-08   
 
 
 Model V.6 tests Hypothesis 3 by adding a dummy variable indicating whether the 
MLB franchise plays its home games in the same stadium as does an NFL franchise. Its 
coefficient has the ‘wrong sign’ and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Model V.6 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_NFL + Pop_per_team + Championships +  
    Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q      Median      3Q     Max  
-6.5739 -2.6801  0.2220  2.2684  7.1683  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)             4.829e+00   3.614e+00    1.336   0.19404     
Share_NFL               3.403e-01   2.604e+00    0.131   0.89713     
Pop_per_team            2.992e-06   1.603e-06    1.866   0.07429 .   
Championships           3.769e-01   1.530e-01    2.463   0.02134 *   
Tenure_in_stadium       1.713e-01   3.369e-02    5.085  3.36e-05 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007  1.656e-01   4.693e-02    3.530   0.00171 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.798 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8148,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7763  
F-statistic: 21.12 on 5 and 24 DF,  p-value: 4.448e-08 
 
 
 No MLB and NFL franchises located in the same metro area have common 
ownership. Thus, Model V.6 also tests the impact of stadium-sharing with a ‘rival’ NFL 
team and is analogous to Models III.7 and IV.7. Thus, the results do not support 
Hypothesis 3. 
 Model V.8 investigates Hypotheses 4-6 by adding two ‘cooperation’ variables: (1) 
common ownership with another major professional sports franchise located in the same 
metro area and (2) participation in a regional sports network joint venture with at least 
one other major professional sports franchise in the same area. No MLB franchise 
participates in a stadium joint venture with another major professional sports franchise. 
The coefficient of the common ownership variable is negative, but not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. However, the coefficient of the regional sports network joint 
venture dummy variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and implies that, all 
else equal, ticket prices are $4.80 higher for MLB franchises involved in an RSN joint 
venture with at least one other major professional sports team. 
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Model V.8 
 
 Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Own_another_franchise + RSNJV + Pop_per_team +  
    Championships + Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
      Min        1Q              Median        3Q       Max  
-5.160467 -2.654112 -0.003188  2.279326  5.630824  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)               5.017e+00   2.888e+00     1.737  0.095714 .   
Own_another_franchise   -2.527e+00   2.216e+00   -1.141  0.265769     
RSNJV                     4.800e+00   1.956e+00     2.454  0.022144 *   
Pop_per_team              2.913e-06   1.450e-06     2.009  0.056449 .   
Championships             4.126e-01   1.389e-01     2.971  0.006841 **  
Tenure_in_stadium         1.311e-01   3.368e-02     3.893  0.000733 *** 
Attend_to_capacity2007    1.678e-01   3.939e-02     4.261  0.000294 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.431 on 23 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8552,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.8174  
F-statistic: 22.64 on 6 and 23 DF,  p-value: 1.414e-08 
 
 
 To further examine the impact of RSN joint ventures, Model V.9 replaces the 
RSNJV dummy variable with dummy variables indicating an RSN joint venture with 
another MLB team and an RSN joint venture with an NHL team.17 The coefficients of 
both dummy variables are not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
                                                
17 As Table I.5 shows, there are three jointly-owned regional sports networks, none of 
which involve an NFL franchise and only one of which involves an NBA franchise. The 
Chicago RSN includes the NBA’s Bulls, but the Bulls have common ownership with 
another of the joint venture’s participants, MLB’s White Sox. Thus, I do not include a 
dummy variable indicating the participation of an NBA franchise in an RSN joint 
venture.  
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Model V.9 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ RSNJV_MLB + RSNJV_NHL + Pop_per_team +  
    Championships + Tenure_in_stadium + Attend_to_capacity2007) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q       Median      3Q     Max  
-5.0087 -2.6819 -0.8065  2.8025  5.3459  
 
Coefficients: 
                          Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)             5.681e+00   3.406e+00    1.668   0.10887    
RSNJV_MLB               2.541e+00   2.671e+00    0.951   0.35134    
RSNJV_NHL               1.696e+00   4.166e+00    0.407   0.68769    
Pop_per_team            2.450e-06   1.622e-06    1.511   0.14447    
Championships           4.231e-01   1.508e-01    2.806   0.01002 *  
Tenure_in_stadium       1.523e-01   4.476e-02    3.403   0.00244 ** 
Attend_to_capacity2007  1.608e-01   4.677e-02    3.437   0.00225 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 3.687 on 23 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.8328,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7892  
F-statistic: 19.09 on 6 and 23 DF,  p-value: 7.06e-08 
 
 
 Overall, it appears that competition between an MLB franchise and other major 
professional sports franchises in the same metro area does not have a statistically 
significant impact on MLB ticket prices for the 2008 season. Nor does common 
ownership between an MLB franchise and another major professional sports franchise in 
the same metro area appear to affect ticket prices. However, there is some evidence – 
albeit not particularly robust – that, all else equal, ticket prices are approximately $4.80 
higher if an MLB franchise participates in a regional sports network joint venture with at 
least one other major professional sports franchise in the same area. 
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VI.   NFL Ticket Prices: Econometric Results  
As in Model III.1 for NBA ticket prices, Model VI.1 is a regression of the average 
ticket price for each NFL team for the 2008 season on population scaled by the number of  
major professional sports teams in the same metro area, player payroll for the 2007 
season, and the number of championships won during the team’s current tenure in the 
metro area. All three coefficients are positive, although the coefficient of championships 
is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model VI.1 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-15.6345  -7.3285  -0.3334   4.8573  36.4877  
 
Coefficients: 
                Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)    6.451e+00   2.596e+01    0.248    0.8056   
Pop_per_team   1.247e-05   4.630e-06    2.692    0.0118 * 
Payroll2007    4.904e-07   2.413e-07    2.032    0.0518 . 
Championships  1.028e+00   7.045e-01    1.459    0.1558   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.71 on 28 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3133,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2397  
F-statistic: 4.258 on 3 and 28 DF,  p-value: 0.01345 
 
 
 Model VI.2 adds a dummy variable indicating the existence of a rival NFL team 
in the same metro area. The dummy variable’s coefficient has the ‘wrong sign’, given 
Hypothesis 1, but is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model VI.2 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NFLexist + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q        Median       3Q      Max  
-17.9435  -7.3103  -0.8813   3.4925  35.5990  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)    -1.245e+00   2.640e+01   -0.047    0.9627   
NFLexist         1.367e+01   1.083e+01     1.262    0.2179   
Pop_per_team     9.095e-06   5.304e-06     1.715    0.0978 . 
Payroll2007      5.997e-07   2.541e-07     2.360    0.0257 * 
Championships    8.483e-01   7.115e-01     1.192    0.2435   
--- 
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Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.58 on 27 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3515,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2554  
F-statistic: 3.659 on 4 and 27 DF,  p-value: 0.0166 
 
 
 Model VI.3 adds dummy variables indicating the existence of NBA, NHL, and 
MLB teams in the same metro area as the NFL team. Each of the coefficients of these 
dummy variables has the ‘wrong sign’ and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model VI.3 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ NFLexist + NBAexist + NHLexist + MLBexist +  
    Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-15.137  -6.115  -1.353   4.502  33.285  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)    -5.521e-01   2.663e+01   -0.021    0.9836   
NFLexist         1.445e+01   1.119e+01     1.291    0.2091   
NBAexist         1.339e+00   4.482e+00     0.299    0.7678   
NHLexist         2.008e+00   4.576e+00     0.439    0.6648   
MLBexist         7.735e+00   5.918e+00     1.307    0.2035   
Pop_per_team     4.878e-06   6.023e-06     0.810    0.4259   
Payroll2007      5.627e-07   2.569e-07     2.190    0.0385 * 
Championships    7.272e-01   7.295e-01     0.997    0.3288   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.66 on 24 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4158,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2454  
F-statistic:  2.44 on 7 and 24 DF,  p-value: 0.04867 
 
 
 Model VI.4 tests whether NFL franchises in ‘single team markets’ charge higher 
or lower ticket prices. The dummy variable’s coefficient is negative, but is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Model VI.4 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Oneteammarket + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q         Median       3Q      Max  
-15.9016  -6.6500  -0.7241   6.0887  36.8263  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)      1.763e+01   2.656e+01     0.664    0.5126   
Oneteammarket  -1.377e+01   9.401e+00   -1.465    0.1545   
Pop_per_team     1.060e-05   4.713e-06     2.250    0.0328 * 
Payroll2007      3.999e-07   2.445e-07     1.635    0.1136   
Championships    1.446e+00   7.471e-01     1.935    0.0636 . 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.47 on 27 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3638,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2696  
F-statistic:  3.86 on 4 and 27 DF,  p-value: 0.01318 
 
 Thus, the results of Models VI.2-VI.4 do not support Hypothesis 1. 
 Model VI.5 tests whether the total number of major professional sports teams in a 
metro area impacts an NFL team’s ticket prices. The coefficient of total teams has the 
‘wrong sign’, given Hypothesis 2, and is statistically significant at the 10% level. One 
interpretation of this result is that the total teams variable is acting as a proxy for the 
demand for attendance at major professional games. Metro areas with greater such 
demand may attract more major professional sports teams.  
 
Model VI.5 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Totalteams + Pop_per_team + Payroll2007 +  
    Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-17.043  -6.502  -1.019   5.003  33.174  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)    -4.554e+00   2.537e+01   -0.180    0.8589   
Totalteams       2.929e+00   1.496e+00     1.957    0.0607 . 
Pop_per_team     6.049e-06   5.497e-06     1.100    0.2809   
Payroll2007      5.839e-07   2.349e-07     2.485    0.0194 * 
Championships    6.174e-01   7.033e-01     0.878    0.3878   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.16 on 27 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3986,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3095  
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F-statistic: 4.474 on 4 and 27 DF,  p-value: 0.006663 
 
 
 With respect to Hypothesis 3, Model VI.6 examines the impact of stadium 
sharing, either with another NFL team or an MLB team, on NFL ticket prices. Neither 
dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model VI.6 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = AveTick2008 ~ Share_NFL + Share_MLB + Pop_per_team +  
    Payroll2007 + Championships) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q     Median      3Q     Max  
-17.768  -7.181  -1.630   4.817  35.023  
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)    -8.219e+00   2.928e+01   -0.281    0.7811   
Share_NFL        1.470e+01   1.111e+01     1.323    0.1973   
Share_MLB        4.543e+00   7.777e+00     0.584    0.5641   
Pop_per_team     9.317e-06   5.383e-06     1.731    0.0953 . 
Payroll2007      6.610e-07   2.778e-07     2.379    0.0250 * 
Championships    8.721e-01   7.215e-01     1.209    0.2377   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 11.73 on 26 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3599,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2368  
F-statistic: 2.924 on 5 and 26 DF,  p-value: 0.03177 
 
 
 Since no MLB and NFL teams in the same metro area have common ownership, 
the results of Model VI.6 are unchanged when the ‘stadium sharing’ variable is restricted 
to teams without common ownership. Thus, the results of Model VI.6 do not support 
Hypothesis 3. 
Hypotheses 4-6 cannot be investigated. Unlike NBA, NHL, and MLB franchises, 
NFL franchises have not participated with franchises in other leagues in stadium or 
regional sports network joint ventures. And as just noted, no NFL team has common 
ownership with another major professional sports franchise located in the same metro 
area. In other words, there is no cross-sectional variation in the ‘cooperation’ explanatory 
variables across NFL franchises. 
In summary, competition between an NFL franchise and another major 
professional sports team located in the same metro area does not appear to affect NFL 
ticket prices. Neither does the sharing of a stadium with another NFL or MLB team. 
Moreover, NFL ticket prices cannot be affected by participation with other major 
professional sports teams in regional sports network joint ventures or stadium joint 
ventures since NFL teams do not participate in such joint ventures. Nor can NFL ticket 
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prices be affected by common ownership with another major professional sports team in 
the same metro area, since such common ownership does not occur. 
 
 
IV.   Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
Intuitively, it appears reasonable to expect that franchises in the same and 
different major professional sports leagues located in the same metropolitan area compete 
for attendance at their home games. For example, Chicago fans have the option of 
attending a Cubs or White Sox baseball game, a Bears football game, a Bulls basketball 
game, or a Blackhawks hockey game. It appears plausible that the ticket prices for Bears 
games, say, are constrained by the prices charged by the other franchises for attendance at 
their games. Yet, an analysis of ticket prices for the 2008 season fails to find a 
statistically significant impact. This result may occur either because (1) our intuition is 
wrong and the sports franchises do not compete against one another for fan attendance at 
home games or, alternatively, (2) ticket prices are constrained by the prices of other 
forms of entertainment (e.g., movies, concerts) so that the marginal impact of the 
existence of a rival sports franchise is negligible. 
Similarly, one may expect that franchises in the same or different sports leagues 
located in the same metro area compete less intensely for fan attendance if they 
‘cooperate’ via common ownership, a regional sports network joint venture, or a stadium 
joint venture. In Chicago, for example, the White Sox and the Bulls have common 
ownership, the Bulls and Blackhawks participate in a stadium joint venture, and these 
three franchises, along with the Cubs, participate in a regional sports network. Yet, once 
again, the analysis of ticket prices for the 2008 season fails to find a statistically 
significant impact of common ownership and joint venture participation. In addition to 
possible explanations (1) and (2) in the preceding paragraph, this result may occur 
because such cooperation produces cost savings and franchises pass on just enough of 
those savings so that the net impact of the cooperation is negligible. 
 Overall, the econometric results of this study do not provide strong support for the 
assertion that sports franchises compete intensely with one another for fans. On the other 
hand, the results also do not provide strong support for the assertion that cooperation 
between sports franchises harms fans. 
 Given that the analysis is limited to a single season, one may question the 
robustness of these findings. One possibility is to construct a panel for each league 
covering a number of seasons. Team Marketing Report has collected franchise-level 
ticket price data for the four major professional sports leagues back to the early- or mid-
1990s and annually publishes Inside the Ownership of Pro Sports, which contains owner 
profiles and other information. Construction of such a panel dataset for each league could 
result in better estimates of the impact on ticket prices of competition and cooperation 
between sports franchises. 
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Appendix 
 
NBA Dataset 
 
NBA_Team AveTick2008 Share_NHL Own_NHL Own_MLB Jvstadium Share_NBA RSNJV_MLB 
AH 36.9 1 1 0 0 0 0 
BC 68.55 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CBob 33.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CBull 64.25 1 0 1 1 0 2 
CC 55.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DM 62.1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
DN 47.3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
DP 47.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GSW 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HR 43.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IP 41.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LAC 54.5 1 0 0 0 1 0 
LAL 93.25 1 0 0 0 1 0 
MG 24.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MH 58.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MB 47.86 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 36.26 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NJN 54.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOH 25.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NYK 70.51 1 1 0 0 0 0 
OCT 36.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OM 40.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P76 43 1 1 0 0 0 0 
PS 64.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 61.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SK 59.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SAS 56.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TR 45.31 1 1 0 0 0 0 
UJ 43.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WW 29.14 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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NBA Dataset (continued) 
 
NBA_Team RSNJV_NBA RSNJV_NHL Attend2007 Winpct2007 Payroll2007 Attend_to_capacity2007 
AH 0 0 16280 0.451 58531493 83.7 
BC 0 0 18624 0.805 73812248 100 
CBob 0 0 14717 0.39 51725077 77.4 
CBull 0 1 21987 0.402 62840762 101.3 
CC 0 0 20465 0.549 84248364 99.5 
DM 0 0 20286 0.622 88423898 98.9 
DN 0 0 17364 0.61 81177202 90.6 
DP 0 0 22076 0.72 66561030 100 
GSW 0 0 19630 0.585 70276090 100.2 
HR 0 0 17524 0.671 77637117 94.7 
IP 0 0 12221 0.439 66879374 66.6 
LAC 0 0 16888 0.28 63202582 88.9 
LAL 0 0 18997 0.695 71264184 98.5 
MG 0 0 12770 0.268 54472106 69.4 
MH 0 0 19463 0.183 74736115 99.3 
MB 0 0 15595 0.317 62317859 83.3 
MT 0 0 14476 0.268 51128758 76.2 
NJN 0 0 15656 0.415 65429187 78.3 
NOH 0 0 14181 0.683 60331047 82.4 
NYK 0 0 19115 0.28 92817398 99.1 
OCT 0 0 NA 0.244 52600205 NA 
OM 0 0 17301 0.634 61841463 100.3 
P76 0 0 14870 0.488 57777929 72.7 
PS 0 0 18422 0.671 71227313 96.8 
PT 0 0 19550 0.5 57200851 97.8 
SK 0 0 14150 0.463 50531216 81.7 
SAS 0 0 18564 0.683 72492015 100.3 
TR 0 0 19435 0.5 63762305 98.2 
UJ 0 0 19907 0.659 54683522 100 
WW 0 0 17962 0.524 61133847 89 
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NBA Dataset (continued) 
 
NBA_Team NBAteams NHLteams MLBteams NFLteams Population Income NE SE NC 
AH 0 1 1 1 5278904 36061 0 1 0 
BC 0 1 1 1 4482857 50542 1 0 0 
CBob 0 0 0 1 1651568 32245 0 1 0 
CBull 0 1 2 1 9524673 41591 0 0 1 
CC 0 0 1 1 2096471 37407 0 0 1 
DM 0 1 1 1 6145037 39924 0 0 0 
DN 0 1 1 1 2464866 44691 0 0 1 
DP 0 1 1 1 4467592 38118 0 0 1 
GSW 0 0 2 2 4203898 57746 0 0 0 
HR 0 0 1 1 5628101 43174 0 0 0 
IP 0 0 0 1 1695037 37734 0 0 1 
LAC 1 2 2 0 12875587 39880 0 0 0 
LAL 1 2 2 0 12875587 39880 0 0 0 
MG 0 0 0 0 1280533 35470 0 0 0 
MH 0 1 1 1 5413212 40737 0 1 0 
MB 0 0 1 0 1544398 39536 0 0 1 
MT 0 1 1 1 3208212 44238 0 0 1 
NJN 0 1 2 2 4448383 49730 1 0 0 
NOH 0 0 0 1 1030363 40211 0 0 0 
NYK 0 2 2 2 14367605 49792 1 0 0 
OCT 0 0 0 0 1192989 35636 0 0 0 
OM 0 0 0 0 2032496 33092 0 1 0 
P76 0 1 1 1 5827962 43364 1 0 0 
PS 0 1 1 1 4179427 34215 0 0 0 
PT 0 0 0 0 2175113 36845 0 0 0 
SK 0 0 0 0 2091120 37078 0 0 0 
SAS 0 0 0 0 1990675 32811 0 0 0 
TR 0 1 1 0 5113149 NA 0 0 0 
UJ 0 0 0 0 1099973 35145 0 0 1 
WW 0 1 1 1 5306565 51868 1 0 0 
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NBA Dataset (continued) 
 
NBA_Team SC West Canada Franchise_current_city Franchise_current_stadium Championships 
AH 0 0 0 1968 1999 0 
BC 0 0 0 1946 1995 16 
CBob 0 0 0 2004 2005 0 
CBull 0 0 0 1966 1994 6 
CC 0 0 0 1970 1994 0 
DM 1 0 0 1980 2001 0 
DN 0 0 0 1976 1999 0 
DP 0 0 0 1948 1988 3 
GSW 0 1 0 1962 1997 1 
HR 1 0 0 1971 2003 2 
IP 0 0 0 1976 1999 0 
LAC 0 1 0 1984 1999 0 
LAL 0 1 0 1948 1999 14 
MG 1 0 0 2001 2004 0 
MH 0 0 0 1988 2000 1 
MB 0 0 0 1968 1988 1 
MT 0 0 0 1989 1990 0 
NJN 0 0 0 1976 1981 0 
NOH 1 0 0 2007 2007 0 
NYK 0 0 0 1946 1968 2 
OCT 1 0 0 2008 2008 0 
OM 0 0 0 1989 1989 0 
P76 0 0 0 1949 1996 3 
PS 1 0 0 1968 1992 0 
PT 0 1 0 1970 1995 1 
SK 0 1 0 1985 1988 0 
SAS 1 0 0 1976 2002 4 
TR 0 0 1 1995 1999 0 
UJ 0 0 0 1979 1991 0 
WW 0 0 0 1973 1997 1 
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NFL Dataset 
 
NFL_Team AveTick2008 Share_MLB Share_NFL Attend2007 Attend_to_capacity2007 
AC 65.08 0 0 64580 101.9 
AF 63.95 0 0 68395 96 
BR 77.2 0 0 71153 103.2 
BB 51.24 0 0 71054 88.8 
CP 63.32 0 0 73402 100.2 
CBears 88.33 0 0 62158 92.9 
CBengals 69.85 0 0 65790 100.4 
CBrowns 54.41 0 0 73000 101.4 
DC 84.12 0 0 63534 96.5 
DB 76.75 0 0 76611 100.6 
DL 66.39 0 0 61304 94.3 
GBP 63.39 0 0 70805 116.5 
HT 66.69 0 0 70519 101.5 
IC 81.13 0 0 57305 98.8 
JJ 55.3 0 0 65301 97.2 
KCC 80.69 0 0 76777 96.6 
MD 66.11 1 0 72229 94.4 
MV 73.23 1 0 63256 98.7 
NEP 117.84 0 0 68756 101.1 
NOS 62.22 0 0 70004 95.9 
NYG 88.06 0 1 78731 100 
NYJ 86.99 0 1 77106 97.9 
OR 62.23 1 0 59110 93.8 
PE 69 0 0 68169 103.3 
PS 67.47 0 0 62084 95.5 
SDC 81.39 0 0 65502 91.9 
SFF 70.55 0 0 68028 96.9 
SS 61.25 0 0 68193 101.8 
SLR 68.28 0 0 64294 98.4 
TBB 90.13 0 0 65316 99.5 
TT 58.55 0 0 69143 103.2 
WR 79.13 0 0 88090 110 
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NFL Dataset (continued) 
 
NFL_Team Winpct2007 Payroll2007 NFLteams MLBteams NBAteams NHLteams 
AC 0.5 98694817 0 1 1 1 
AF 0.25 83845371 0 1 1 1 
BR 0.313 104997764 0 1 0 0 
BB 0.438 108875882 0 0 0 1 
CP 0.438 93944262 0 0 1 0 
CBears 0.438 104151969 0 2 1 1 
CBengals 0.438 98529188 0 1 0 0 
CBrowns 0.625 102394922 0 1 1 0 
DC 0.813 107376072 0 1 1 1 
DB 0.438 102152344 0 1 1 1 
DL 0.438 106731910 0 1 1 1 
GBP 0.813 97653823 0 0 0 0 
HT 0.5 98154775 0 1 1 0 
IC 0.813 102786398 0 0 1 0 
JJ 0.688 94030775 0 0 0 0 
KCC 0.25 108482459 0 1 0 0 
MD 0.063 92573123 0 1 1 1 
MV 0.5 92161921 0 1 1 1 
NEP 1 117963182 0 1 1 1 
NOS 0.438 110417011 0 0 1 0 
NYG 0.625 75755388 1 2 2 3 
NYJ 0.25 99971535 1 2 2 3 
OR 0.25 90869865 0 1 1 0 
PE 0.5 100807309 0 1 1 1 
PS 0.625 106293914 0 1 0 1 
SDC 0.688 102460685 0 1 0 0 
SFF 0.313 106877077 0 1 1 0 
SS 0.625 99567188 0 1 0 0 
SLR 0.188 100340467 0 1 0 1 
TBB 0.563 98105565 0 1 0 1 
TT 0.625 97081153 0 0 0 1 
WR 0.563 123408019 0 1 1 1 
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NFL Dataset (continued) 
 
NFL_Team Population Income NE SE NC SC West 
AC 4179427 34215 0 0 0 1 0 
AF 5278904 36061 0 1 0 0 0 
BR 2668056 43027 1 0 0 0 0 
BB 1128183 33803 0 0 1 0 0 
CP 1651568 32245 0 1 0 0 0 
CBears 9524673 41591 0 0 1 0 0 
CBengals 2133678 36650 0 0 1 0 0 
CBrowns 2096471 37407 0 0 1 0 0 
DC 6145037 39924 0 0 0 1 0 
DB 2464866 44691 0 0 1 0 0 
DL 4467592 38118 0 0 1 0 0 
GBP 301131 33627 0 0 1 0 0 
HT 5628101 43174 0 0 0 1 0 
IC 1695037 37734 0 0 1 0 0 
JJ 1300823 37518 0 1 0 0 0 
KCC 1985429 37566 0 0 1 0 0 
MD 5413212 40737 0 1 0 0 0 
MV 3208212 44238 0 0 1 0 0 
NEP 4482857 50542 1 0 0 0 0 
NOS 1030363 40211 0 0 0 1 0 
NYG 18815988 49789 1 0 0 0 0 
NYJ 18815988 49789 1 0 0 0 0 
OR 2483842 48577 0 0 0 0 1 
PE 5827962 43364 1 0 0 0 0 
PS 2355712 38550 0 0 1 0 0 
SDC 2974859 42801 0 0 0 0 1 
SFF 1720056 70995 0 0 0 0 1 
SS 3309347 45369 0 0 0 0 1 
SLR 2803707 37653 0 0 1 0 0 
TBB 2723949 35542 0 1 0 0 0 
TT 1521437 37758 0 0 0 1 0 
WR 5306565 51868 1 0 0 0 0 
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NFL Dataset (continued) 
 
NFL_Team Franchise_current_city Franchise_current_stadium Championships 
AC 1988 2006 0 
AF 1966 1992 0 
BR 1996 1998 1 
BB 1960 1973 0 
CP 1995 1996 0 
CBears 1920 2003 9 
CBengals 1968 2000 0 
CBrowns 1999 1999 0 
DC 1960 1971 5 
DB 1960 2001 2 
DL 1930 2002 4 
GBP 1921 1957 12 
HT 2002 2002 0 
IC 1984 2008 1 
JJ 1995 1995 0 
KCC 1963 1972 1 
MD 1966 1987 2 
MV 1961 1982 1 
NEP 1960 2002 3 
NOS 2006 2006 0 
NYG 1925 1976 7 
NYJ 1960 1984 1 
OR 1995 1995 0 
PE 1933 2003 3 
PS 1933 2001 6 
SDC 1961 1967 0 
SFF 1950 1971 5 
SS 1976 2002 0 
SLR 1995 1995 1 
TBB 1976 1998 1 
TT 1998 1999 0 
WR 1932 1997 5 
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NHL Dataset 
 
NHL_Team AveTick2008 Share_NBA Own_MLB Own_NBA JVstadium 
AD 43.5 0 0 0 0 
AT 48.51 1 0 1 0 
BB 61.4 1 0 0 0 
BS 36.43 0 0 0 0 
CF 55.81 0 0 0 0 
CH 38.38 0 0 0 0 
CB 52.22 1 0 0 1 
CA 40.62 1 0 1 0 
CBJ 47.76 0 0 0 0 
DS 37.8 1 1 0 1 
DRW 46.4 0 1 0 0 
EO 54.17 0 0 0 0 
FP 52.61 0 0 0 0 
LAK 47.2 1 0 0 0 
MW 61.28 0 0 0 0 
MC 64.26 0 0 0 0 
NP 47.22 0 0 0 0 
NJD 57.15 0 0 0 0 
NYI 48.84 0 0 0 0 
NYR 54.96 1 0 1 0 
OS 48.82 0 0 0 0 
PF 60.25 1 0 1 0 
PC 37.45 0 0 0 0 
PP 51.45 0 0 0 0 
SJS 43.07 0 0 0 0 
SLB 29.94 0 0 0 0 
TBL 42.41 0 0 0 0 
TML 76.15 1 0 1 0 
VC 62.05 0 0 0 0 
WC 41.66 1 0 0 0 
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NHL Dataset (continued) 
 
NHL_Team RSNJV_MLB RSNJV_NBA RSNJV_NHL Attend2007 Points2007 Payroll2007 
AD 0 0 0 17193 102 50769200 
AT 0 0 0 15831 76 36580000 
BB 1 0 0 15384 94 49501600 
BS 0 0 0 19950 90 45954400 
CF 0 0 0 19289 94 50934900 
CH 0 0 0 16633 92 49948600 
CB 2 1 0 16814 88 34800540 
CA 0 0 0 16842 95 61290750 
CBJ 0 0 0 14823 80 28010000 
DS 0 0 0 18038 97 49420000 
DRW 0 0 0 18870 115 44633000 
EO 0 0 0 16839 88 46915659 
FP 0 0 0 15436 85 39749200 
LAK 0 0 0 16606 71 40502000 
MW 0 0 0 18568 98 46183000 
MC 0 0 0 21273 104 42313500 
NP 0 0 0 14910 91 30273340 
NJD 0 0 0 15564 99 47622511 
NYI 0 0 0 13640 79 39007720 
NYR 0 0 0 18200 97 56705000 
OS 0 0 0 19821 94 49997370 
PF 0 0 0 19556 95 56973200 
PC 0 0 0 14820 83 35694750 
PP 0 0 0 17076 102 41384200 
SJS 0 0 0 17411 108 41454800 
SLB 0 0 0 17610 79 39047833 
TBL 0 0 0 18692 71 38954167 
TML 0 0 0 19434 83 46445180 
VC 0 0 0 18630 88 45710000 
WC 0 0 0 15472 94 44309200 
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NHL Dataset (continued) 
 
NHL_Team Attend_to_capacity2007 NHLteams NBAteams MLBteams NFLteams 
AD 102.6 0 2 1 0 
AT 85.4 0 1 1 1 
BB 87.6 0 1 1 1 
BS 109.4 0 0 0 1 
CF 112.4 0 0 0 0 
CH 88.8 0 0 0 0 
CB 82 0 1 2 1 
CA 93.5 0 1 1 1 
CBJ 81.7 0 0 0 0 
DS 97.3 0 1 1 1 
DRW 94 0 1 1 1 
EO 98.5 0 0 0 0 
FP 80.2 0 1 1 1 
LAK 92 0 2 1 0 
MW 102.8 0 1 1 1 
MC 100 0 0 0 0 
NP 87.1 0 0 0 1 
NJD 81.7 0 1 2 2 
NYI 83.7 1 1 2 2 
NYR 100 1 1 2 2 
OS 107.1 0 0 0 0 
PF 100.3 0 1 1 1 
PC 84.7 0 1 1 1 
PP 100.7 0 0 1 1 
SJS 99.5 0 0 0 0 
SLB 83.9 0 0 1 1 
TBL 94.6 0 1 1 1 
TML 103.3 0 1 1 0 
VC 101.1 0 0 0 0 
WC 82.9 0 1 1 1 
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NHL Dataset (continued) 
 
NHL_Team Population Income NE SE NC SC West Canada 
AD 2997033 48209 0 0 0 0 1 0 
AT 5278904 36061 0 1 0 0 0 0 
BB 4482857 50542 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BS 1128183 33803 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CF 1079310 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CH 1047629 37222 0 1 0 0 0 0 
CB 9524673 41591 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CA 2464866 44691 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CBJ 1754337 36109 0 0 1 0 0 0 
DS 6145037 39924 0 0 0 1 0 0 
DRW 4467592 38118 0 0 1 0 0 0 
EO 1034945 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FP 5413212 40737 0 1 0 0 0 0 
LAK 9878554 37362 0 0 0 0 1 0 
MW 3208212 44238 0 0 1 0 0 0 
MC 3635571 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NP 1521437 37758 0 0 0 1 0 0 
NJD 4448383 49730 1 0 0 0 0 0 
NYI 14367605 49792 1 0 0 0 0 0 
NYR 14367605 49792 1 0 0 0 0 0 
OS 1130761 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PF 5827962 43364 1 0 0 0 0 0 
PC 4179427 34215 0 0 0 1 0 0 
PP 2355712 38550 0 0 1 0 0 0 
SJS 1803643 55020 0 0 0 0 1 0 
SLB 2803707 37653 0 0 1 0 0 0 
TBL 2723949 35542 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TML 5113149 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
VC 2116581 NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 
WC 5306565 51868 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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NHL Dataset (continued) 
 
NHL_Team Franchise_current_city Franchise_current_stadium Championships 
AD 1993 1993 1 
AT 1999 1999 0 
BB 1924 1995 5 
BS 1970 1996 0 
CF 1980 1983 1 
CH 1997 1999 1 
CB 1926 1994 3 
CA 1995 1999 2 
CBJ 2000 2000 0 
DS 1993 2001 1 
DRW 1926 1979 11 
EO 1979 1979 5 
FP 1993 1998 0 
LAK 1967 1999 0 
MW 2000 2000 0 
MC 1917 1996 23 
NP 1998 1998 0 
NJD 1974 2007 3 
NYI 1972 1972 4 
NYR 1926 1968 4 
OS 1992 1996 0 
PF 1967 1996 2 
PC 1996 2003 0 
PP 1967 1967 2 
SJS 1991 1993 0 
SLB 1967 1994 0 
TBL 1992 1996 1 
TML 1917 1999 13 
VC 1970 1995 0 
WC 1974 1997 0 
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MLB Dataset 
 
MLB_Team AveTick2008 Share_NFL Own_NHL Own_NBA RSNJV_MLB RSNJV_NBA 
AD 15.96 0 0 0 0 0 
AB 17.05 0 0 0 0 0 
BO 23.85 0 0 0 1 0 
BRS 48.4 0 0 0 0 0 
CC 42.49 0 0 0 1 1 
CWS 30.28 0 0 1 1 1 
CReds 19.41 0 0 0 0 0 
CI 25.72 0 0 0 0 0 
CRockies 19.5 0 0 0 0 0 
DT 25.28 0 1 0 0 0 
FM 18.69 1 0 0 0 0 
HA 28.73 0 0 0 0 0 
KCR 17.54 0 0 0 0 0 
LAA 20.78 0 0 0 0 0 
LAD 29.66 0 0 0 0 0 
MB 19.88 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 20.68 1 0 0 0 0 
NYM 34.05 0 0 0 0 0 
NYY 41.4 0 0 0 0 0 
OA 29.2 1 0 0 0 0 
PPhillies 28.14 0 0 0 0 0 
PPirates 17.07 0 0 0 0 0 
SDP 27.43 0 0 0 0 0 
SFG 22.06 0 0 0 0 0 
SM 25.29 0 0 0 0 0 
SLC 29.32 0 0 0 0 0 
TBR 17.23 0 0 0 0 0 
TR 18.01 0 1 0 0 0 
TB 28.37 0 0 0 0 0 
WN 25 0 0 0 1 0 
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MLB Dataset (continued) 
 
MLB_Team RSNJV_NHL Attend2007 Attend_to_capacity2007 Winpct2007 Payroll2007 
AD 0 28708 58.5 0.556 52067546 
AB 0 33891 67.7 0.519 87290833 
BO 0 27060 56.2 0.426 93554808 
BRS 1 36679 101.4 0.593 143026214 
CC 1 40153 97.7 0.525 99670332 
CWS 1 33140 81.6 0.444 108671833 
CReds 0 25414 60.4 0.444 68904980 
CI 0 28448 65.6 0.595 61673267 
CRockies 0 28978 57.4 0.552 54424000 
DT 0 37619 93.8 0.543 95180369 
FM 0 16919 46.6 0.438 30507000 
HA 0 37288 91.1 0.451 87759000 
KCR 0 19961 48.9 0.426 67116500 
LAA 0 41551 92.2 0.58 109251333 
LAD 0 47617 85 0.506 108454524 
MB 0 35421 83.5 0.512 70986500 
MT 0 28349 58.2 0.488 71439500 
NYM 0 47579 82.9 0.543 115231663 
NYY 0 52729 91.7 0.58 189639045 
OA 0 23726 54.3 0.469 79366940 
PPhillies 0 38374 88.2 0.549 89428213 
PPirates 0 22141 57.7 0.42 38537833 
SDP 0 34445 81 0.546 58110567 
SFG 0 39792 95.8 0.438 90219056 
SM 0 32993 69.1 0.54 106460833 
SLC 0 43854 93.6 0.481 90286823 
TBR 0 17130 40.6 0.407 24123500 
TR 0 29795 60.7 0.463 68318675 
TB 0 29143 57.7 0.512 81942800 
WN 0 24217 53.5 0.451 37347500 
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MLB Dataset (continued) 
 
MLB_Team NFLteams MLBteams NBAteams NHLteams Population Income 
AD 1 0 1 1 4179427 34215 
AB 1 0 1 1 5278904 36061 
BO 1 0 0 0 2668056 43027 
BRS 1 0 1 1 4482857 50542 
CC 1 1 1 1 9524673 41591 
CWS 1 1 1 1 9524673 41591 
CReds 1 0 0 0 2133678 36650 
CI 1 0 1 0 2096471 37407 
CRockies 1 0 1 1 2464866 44691 
DT 1 0 1 1 4467592 38118 
FM 1 0 1 1 5413212 40737 
HA 1 0 1 0 5628101 43174 
KCR 1 0 0 0 1985429 37566 
LAA 0 0 2 1 2997033 48209 
LAD 0 0 2 1 9878554 37362 
MB 0 0 1 0 1544398 39536 
MT 1 0 1 1 3208212 44238 
NYM 2 1 2 3 18815988 49789 
NYY 2 1 2 3 18815988 49789 
OA 1 0 1 0 2483842 48577 
PPhillies 1 0 1 1 5827962 43364 
PPirates 1 0 0 1 2355712 38550 
SDP 1 0 0 0 2974859 42801 
SFG 1 0 0 0 1720056 70995 
SM 1 0 0 0 3309347 45369 
SLC 1 0 0 1 2803707 37653 
TBR 1 0 0 1 2723949 35542 
TR 1 0 1 1 6145037 39924 
TB 0 0 1 1 5113149 NA 
WN 1 0 1 1 5306565 51868 
 
 52 
MLB Dataset (continued) 
 
MLB_Team NE SE NC SC West Canada 
AD 0 0 0 1 0 0 
AB 0 1 0 0 0 0 
BO 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BRS 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CC 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CWS 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CReds 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CI 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CRockies 0 0 1 0 0 0 
DT 0 0 1 0 0 0 
FM 0 1 0 0 0 0 
HA 0 0 0 1 0 0 
KCR 0 0 1 0 0 0 
LAA 0 0 0 0 1 0 
LAD 0 0 0 0 1 0 
MB 0 0 1 0 0 0 
MT 0 0 1 0 0 0 
NYM 1 0 0 0 0 0 
NYY 1 0 0 0 0 0 
OA 0 0 0 0 1 0 
PPhillies 1 0 0 0 0 0 
PPirates 0 0 1 0 0 0 
SDP 0 0 0 0 1 0 
SFG 0 0 0 0 1 0 
SM 0 0 0 0 1 0 
SLC 0 0 1 0 0 0 
TBR 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TR 0 0 0 1 0 0 
TB 0 0 0 0 0 1 
WN 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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MLB Dataset (continued) 
 
MLB_Team Franchise_current_city Franchise_current_stadium Championships 
AD 1998 1998 1 
AB 1966 1997 1 
BO 1954 1992 3 
BRS 1901 1912 7 
CC 1876 1916 2 
CWS 1901 1991 3 
CReds 1890 2003 5 
CI 1901 1994 2 
CRockies 1993 1995 0 
DT 1901 2000 4 
FM 1993 1993 2 
HA 1962 2000 0 
KCR 1969 1973 1 
LAA 1961 2004 1 
LAD 1958 1962 5 
MB 1970 2001 0 
MT 1901 1982 3 
NYM 1962 1964 2 
NYY 1903 1976 26 
OA 1968 1968 4 
PPhillies 1883 2004 1 
PPirates 1887 2001 5 
SDP 1969 2004 0 
SFG 1958 2000 0 
SM 1977 1999 0 
SLC 1892 2006 10 
TBR 1998 1998 0 
TR 1972 1994 0 
TB 1977 1989 2 
WN 2005 2008 0 
 
